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THE NEW SOLVENCY FRAMEWORK FOR  
EUROPEAN INSURANCE COMPANIES
The new solvency framework for 
European insurance companies
Introduction
As is the case for banks, there are two main rationales 
for the existence of speciﬁc supervisory arrangements for 
insurance companies. The ﬁrst rationale is linked to the 
protection of small investors. The reasoning is that deposit 
holders in the case of banks and policyholders in the case 
of insurance companies are mostly widely dispersed non-
experts, as a result of which they lack the expertise to assess 
the ﬁnancial soundness of the institution and to fulﬁl the 
disciplining role that creditors normally assume in times 
of ﬁnancial distress. Moreover, bank depositors and, to a 
lesser extent, insurance policyholders, are often covered 
by guarantee schemes, which reduce any incentive they 
might have to monitor ﬁnancial institutions’ managers’   
risk taking behaviour. There is a need, therefore, for a 
“debt-holder representative” who will ensure “effective 
debt governance” of the institution. This delegated moni-
toring role is often taken on by public authorities.
The  second  rationale  for  the  supervision  of  ﬁnancial 
intermediaries  derives  from  the  negative  externalities 
associated with a crisis. Banks play a dominant role in pay-
ment systems ; therefore, bank failures can jeopardise the 
performance of this critical function. In addition, deposits 
may be withdrawn on demand and, as such, a bank may 
be prone to a loss of conﬁdence and runs, which may 
cause  insolvency  and  create  domino  effects  on  other 
banks, e.g. through the interbank market. Similar, albeit 
less important, contagion effects could take place in the 
insurance  sector  through  the  reinsurance  mechanism, 
endangering the performance of key economic functions 
by the insurance sector. Indirectly, insurance companies 
could also pose threats to ﬁnancial stability via their links 
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with the banking sector. These links are most explicit in 
conglomerates  involving  bancassurance,  but  insurance 
companies  are  also  major  participants  in  ﬁnancial  mar-
kets ; hence problems in this sector might spill over to 
other participants in those markets, including banks.
Supervisory authorities rely on speciﬁc tools and methods 
to perform their tasks. Solvency requirements represent 
one of their most important instruments. In both bank-
ing  and  insurance,  the  current  solvency  system  takes 
insufﬁcient account of the risk proﬁle of the individual 
institutions in setting the capital requirements. To resolve 
this problem, more risk-sensitive supervisory frameworks 
are  currently  being  developed.  The  Basel  II  framework 
for banks will be introduced in 2007, and the Solvency II   
framework  for  insurance  companies  is  expected  to  be 
ﬁnalised by the end of the decade.
These new regulatory frameworks not only aim to reﬁne 
the  calculation  of  capital  requirements,  but  are  also 
intended  to  encourage  the  institutions  concerned  to 
improve the quality of their risk management procedures. 
To that end, they introduce a structure comprising three 
mutually reinforcing pillars. The ﬁrst pillar corresponds to 
the imposition of capital and other quantitative require-
ments geared more closely to the institution’s actual risks ; 
a  second  pillar  introduces  qualitative  requirements  and 
foresees the possibility for prudential authorities to take 
further account of the speciﬁc risk proﬁle of each institu-
tion ; and a third pillar is intended to encourage market 
discipline by imposing greater transparency in the public 
disclosure of information.
(1)  Maciej Sterzynski contributed to this article during an internship at the  
National Bank of Belgium.190
Although Basel II and Solvency II have roughly the same 
philosophy, each needs to take into account the secto-
ral particularities. In banking, short-term liabilities, such 
as  deposits,  are  traditionally  converted  into  long-term, 
illiquid assets. As a result, an important risk for banks is 
the sudden withdrawal of a large part of their deposit 
base, potentially triggering liquidity problems. This calls 
for a supervisory regime that is able to detect such risks 
beforehand and resolve them quickly. The opposite holds 
in insurance, where companies have very long-term liabili-
ties, especially in life insurance, and invest in rather liquid 
assets.  This  allows  supervisors  to  take  a  more  gradual 
approach to resolving ﬁnancial distress.
In addition, the relative importance of the different risks 
varies between the two types of business. Credit activ-
ity, on the assets side, is generally considered to be the 
primary source of risk in banking. In insurance, the focus 
is traditionally on underwriting risk, i.e. the risk of under-
pricing insurance contracts or of underestimating the level 
of  the  liabilities  towards  policyholders.  These  liabilities, 
which correspond to insurance companies’ technical pro-
visions, are inherently uncertain and have to be estimated. 
As a result, provisions are much more important than in 
the case of banks, where both the assets and the liabilities 
can arguably be more accurately valued.
These  speciﬁcities  of  insurance  activities  are  taken  into 
account  by  insurance  regulators  and  supervisors  in  the 
design  of  the  new  solvency  framework,  which  is  pre-
sented  in  this  article.  Section  1  brieﬂy  describes  the 
current  regime  and  its  main  weaknesses.  Section  2 
provides an overview of the main characteristics of the 
new framework and its development process. Section 3 
focuses on the ﬁrst pillar and analyses the changes and 
improvements  that  will  be  introduced  by  Solvency  II.   
The last section concludes.
While reading this article, one should bear in mind that the 
Solvency II framework is still under development. In the 
coming months, further technical issues will be submitted 
for advice to the Committee of European Insurance and 
Occupational Pension Supervisors (CEIOPS, the counter-
part of the Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
in the banking ﬁeld), and for consultation to the sector.   
A  number  of  elements  will  most  likely  be  subject  to 
change, while others have not yet been touched upon. 
The ﬁnal picture will gradually emerge as the negotiations 
continue and the results of the quantitative impact studies 
provide additional information.
1.    Current solvency regulation for 
insurance companies
The present solvency framework for EU insurers is deter-
mined by the solvency margin system. This regime arises 
from the First Generation of Insurance Directives (1970s) 
and  was  conﬁrmed  by  the  Third  Generation  of  direc-
tives in 1992  (1). At the beginning of 2000, the European 
Commission initiated another review of insurance com-
panies’ solvency requirements. This resulted in 2002 in 
the Solvency I framework  (2), which had to be transposed 
into national law by 20 September 2003, but for which 
some  member  states  have  transition  periods  of  up  to 
seven years. Solvency I improves the quality of the policy-
holders’ protection. It introduces an adjusted supervisory 
tool  –  the modiﬁed early warning mechanism  (3)  –  and 
makes solvency requirements for European insurers more 
robust, pending the introduction of Solvency II.
In the current framework, the capital requirements com-
prise both the Minimum Guarantee Fund and the required 
solvency margin. These serve as a buffer, on top of the 
technical  provisions,  to  protect  policyholders  and  other 
beneﬁciaries against potential unexpected claims (e.g. in 
case of an unforeseen concentration of claims) and other 
unexpected losses (e.g. investment losses).
The minimum guarantee fund fulﬁls two important func-
tions.  Firstly,  it  imposes  a  minimum  level  of  regulatory 
capital for launching insurance activities. This minimum 
equals three millions of euros for both life and non-life 
insurance, although in the latter case this amount may be 
reduced to two millions of euros, depending on the risks 
covered. Secondly, it expresses a level of capital below 
which an insurance company presents an unacceptable 
risk  to  policyholders.  Therefore,  the  minimum  guaran-
tee fund may not be less than one third of the required 
solvency  margin  (see  below).  Once  the  capital  of  an 
undertaking drops below this level, the supervisor will be 
obliged to resort to the most severe measures, including 
withdrawing the company’s licence.
The  required  solvency  margin  itself  is  calculated  as  a 
ﬁxed  percentage  of  certain  balance  sheet  and  income 
statement  items.  In  the  case  of  non-life  insurance,  the 
required solvency margin is equal to the higher of two 
amounts, calculated on the basis of either the claims or 
(1)  The single insurance market, which is part of the European internal market, 
relies on three generations of insurance directives. In general they cover the rules 
applying to the conduct of insurance activities, including the ﬁnancial structure of 
insurance undertakings. See also Sterzynski (2003).
(2)  Originally, Solvency I had been meant to consist of two directives, regulating the 
non-life and life business respectively. Since the three generations of life directives 
have been uniﬁed in a Life Recast Directive (directive 2002 / 83 / EC), the Solvency I 
life directive was integrated in this new text. Therefore, there currently exists only 
a Solvency I non-life directive (directive 2002 / 13 / EC).
(3)  The early warning mechanism is a supervisory tool allowing an authority to act 
before the solvency margin is breached. It means the supervisor might require an 
insurance undertaking to provide a recovery plan for its solvency position once 
the ﬁrst symptoms of a deterioration of the overall capital position of a company 
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THE NEW SOLVENCY FRAMEWORK FOR  
EUROPEAN INSURANCE COMPANIES
the underwritten volume (the premiums). In the former 
case, the required solvency margin amounts to 26 p.c. of 
the claims up to 35 millions of euros and 23 p.c. above 
this level  (1). The required solvency margin calculated on the 
basis of the underwritten volume amounts to 18 p.c. of 
gross collected premiums below 50 millions of euros, and 
to 16 p.c. of the premiums above this threshold. In the case 
of life insurance, the required solvency margin is generally 
calculated as 4 p.c. of the mathematical provisions.
However, the current framework presents a number of 
weaknesses. First, the current capital requirement is calcu-
lated on the basis of the volume of liabilities, which does 
not fully reﬂect the risks inherent in the contracts. Such 
a method of calculation may even create perverse incen-
tives, as  –  in life insurance  –  a company can lower its 
capital requirements by reducing its technical provisions, 
while sounder companies, having ample provisions, have 
to hold a higher amount of capital.
Second, other quantiﬁable risks, such as interest rate risk 
and other market risks, are not incorporated in the calcu-
lation of the capital requirement.
Third, the availability of sufﬁcient capital is but one of 
the factors contributing to insurance companies’ solvency 
position. Another important element is the adequacy of 
the technical provisions, which represent their liabilities 
towards the policyholders. These have to be estimated, 
as both the amount and the timing of the future claims 
are uncertain. The current solvency framework does not 
include adequately harmonised rules regarding the calcu-
lation of the technical provisions.
The technical provisions, in turn, have to be covered by 
sufﬁcient investments, which constitute the bulk of insur-
ance companies’ assets. The adequacy and prudent man-
agement of these investments constitutes another corner-
stone of the soundness of insurance companies. Again, 
the current framework only includes very general rules on 
investment  policy  and  does  not  provide  comprehensive 
principles requiring insurance companies to manage their 
investments prudently.
Fourth, the current solvency framework does not include 
a qualitative assessment, for instance of corporate gov-
ernance, internal control and risk management practices, 
which allows to further align capital requirements with 
the speciﬁc proﬁle of each company. It neither comprises 
market disclosure measures to promote market discipline.
2.    The new solvency framework for 
insurance companies in Europe
2.1  A short description of Solvency II
In order to resolve as far as possible the above-mentioned 
weaknesses, Solvency II aims at introducing risk-sensitive 
supervision  for  insurance  companies,  relying  on  a  risk-
based framework for their solvency assessment. The new 
framework does not only allow better alignment of the 
capital requirements with the risk proﬁle of the company, 
but will also induce insurance undertakings to improve 
their internal risk management systems. This should lead 
to better protection for policyholders and greater ﬁnancial 
stability, and improve the level playing ﬁeld within and 
across sectors. It will also give insurance companies more 
ﬂexibility in setting their risk proﬁle, permitting a more 
efﬁcient allocation of capital.
The major goal of Solvency II is thus similar to the one pur-
sued by the new Basel II framework for banks, i.e. to put in 
place a risk-based capital framework, adapted to the cur-
rent ﬁnancial environment. The analogy between the two 
frameworks should not only limit the potential for regula-
tory arbitrage, but should also reduce the complexity for 
conglomerates which have to comply with both regulations. 
In this vein, both Basel II and Solvency II adopt a three pillar 
structure and allow the use of internal models (Chart 1).
Pillar I covers the so-called quantitative requirements, i.e. 
those calculated using available actuarial and mathemati-
cal methods. It includes a new approach for the calcula-
tion of the capital requirements, which will be split into 
a Minimum Capital Requirement (MCR) and a Solvency 
Capital Requirement (SCR). It also harmonises the calcula-
tion of the technical provisions and includes revised rules 
on insurance companies’ investments.
Pillar  II  includes  the  non-quantitative  (or  qualitative) 
requirements, which cover the aspects of solvency that 
cannot (fully) be quantiﬁed or deserve additional atten-
tion. The supervisory review process deals with insurance 
companies’  governance,  risk  management  structures, 
internal control and ALM techniques. Supervisors will also 
assess the methodology applied by insurance companies 
for  the  calculation  of  their  capital  requirements.  The 
supervisory authority evaluates these elements in the light 
of the nature of the business of the insurance company 
and its available ﬁnancial resources, and will impose addi-
tional capital requirements if deemed necessary. Pillar II 
will also introduce a peer review procedure for supervisory 
authorities,  in  order  to  promote  the  harmonization  of 
supervisory practices within the EU.
(1)  The required margin is increased by 50 p.c. for the insurance classes 11, 12 
and 13 listed in point A of the Annex to Directive 2002 / 13 / EC. It concerns in 
particular certain risky classes of business, such as general liability insurance in 
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Pillar  III  aims  at  enhancing  market  discipline  by  setting 
requirements regarding the transmission of information 
towards the public, and introducing the use of new inter-
national accounting standards.
2.2  Solvency II development process
Unlike Basel II, Solvency II applies only to the EU Member 
States  and  the  other  three  members  of  the  European 
Economic Area, i.e. Iceland, Lichtenstein and Norway.
The Solvency II project was divided into two phases. In the 
ﬁrst phase, which started in May 2001 and was completed 
by the end of 2004, the structure of the EU insurance 
market was investigated and the main characteristics of 
the project were set out, along with the range of possible 
principles on which the future supervisory system could be 
based. In the second phase, the Framework Directive and 
its implementation measures are being developed.
Solvency II is the ﬁrst insurance directive to be developed 
under the Lamfalussy procedure. This procedure, which 
was originally designed for the securities sector and aims 
at simplifying and speeding up the complex and lengthy 
regular  EU  legislative  process  by  means  of  a  four-level 
approach, was extended to the entire EU ﬁnancial sector 
in December 2002.
Under the Lamfalussy procedure, the legislative process 
has  been  split  into  the  development  of  a  Framework 
Directive  by  the  European  Commission  (called  level  1 
measures), and the elaboration of implementation meas-
ures supporting the Framework Directive (called level 2 
measures) by the European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions  Committee  (EIOPC,  the  counterpart  of  the 
European Banking Committee in the banking ﬁeld) and 
CEIOPS. Given the complexity of the Solvency II project, 
CEIOPS  will  be  involved  in  the  entire  development  of 
the  new  prudential  framework,  by  contributing  to  the 
preparation of the Framework Directive, by assisting the 
European  Commission  in  the  preparation  of  potential 
implementing measures, and later on, by issuing any con-
sequent supervisory measures (level 3 measures).
As  in  the  case  of  the  banking  Capital  Requirements 
Directive,  the  publication  of  the  Solvency  II  Framework 
Directive will be preceded by detailed quantitative impact 
studies (QIS). The goal of these QIS is to estimate pos-
sible economic consequences of the new regulation on 






















CHART 1  THREE PILLAR STRUCTURE OF THE SOLVENCY II FRAMEWORK
QUANTITATIVE
REQUIREMENTS193
THE NEW SOLVENCY FRAMEWORK FOR  
EUROPEAN INSURANCE COMPANIES
the insurance industry and to assist in the design and the 
calibration of the new solvency requirements. At present, 
the results of the ﬁrst QIS, on the technical provisions, are 
already available (see Section 3.1 for the Belgian results), 
while the second QIS, which studies the impact of pos-
sible changes in the valuation of both assets and liabilities 
as  well  as  a  number  of  options  for  setting  the  capital 
requirements, is underway. To supplement the inputs from 
the QIS, the European Commission will also perform an 
Impact Assessment. This is a wider analysis on the conse-
quences of Solvency II for the EU ﬁnancial markets.
The  European  Commission  is  planning  to  issue  the 
Framework  Directive  in  the  second  half  of  2007  and 
the framework is expected to enter into force by 2010   
or 2011.
3.    Quantitative requirements under the 
ﬁrst pillar of Solvency II
The ﬁrst pillar of Solvency II replaces the current solvency 
margin  system  by  risk-based  quantitative  requirements.   
It modiﬁes the approach for the valuation and estimation 
of the technical provisions, introduces a MCR and a SCR 
and  changes  the  rules  regarding  insurance  companies’ 
investment policy.
3.1  Technical provisions
As  already  mentioned,  insurance  companies  agree  to 
cover potential future claims related to speciﬁed insured 
events in exchange for a ﬁxed premium paid in advance. 
The ensuing liabilities of insurance undertakings towards 
the policyholders are thus uncertain and are reﬂected in 
the technical provisions. Solvency II will introduce fair value 
techniques to bring the valuation of these provisions more 
in line with their fair value. These techniques are consist-
ent with the market oriented approach of Solvency II and 
the future version of the international accounting stand-
ard for insurance contracts (IFRS 4 phase II).
The  fair  value  method  developed  by  the  International 
Accounting  Standards  Board  (IASB)  aims  at  a  realistic 
valuation  of  assets  and  liabilities  as  the  amount  for 
which the assets could be exchanged, or the liabilities 
settled,  between  knowledgeable,  willing  parties  in  an 
arm’s  length  transaction.  The  application  of  this  fair 
value technique for valuing life insurance liabilities will, 
however,  create  difﬁculties  as  there  is  in  general  no 
market for exchanging such policies once they are issued 
by insurers. In these cases, their fair value will have to 
be estimated.
The main component of this fair value is the best estimate 
of the present value of the future cash ﬂows from the 
contracts concluded. However, in order to obtain the fair 
value, the best estimate will have to be increased by a 
certain margin, as a knowledgeable independent buyer 
is expected to require a premium for risk and uncertainty 
above the best estimate in order to be willing to accept 
the relevant liabilities. This premium is called the market 
value margin. One of the key discussions in Solvency II 
is  on  an  appropriate  approach  for  introducing  such  a 
margin, which, at the same time, provides sufﬁcient secu-
rity for policyholders and is market-consistent. A number 
of solutions are currently being investigated. 
One solution is to introduce a margin for risk and uncer-
tainty  which  makes  use  of  a  predeﬁned  conﬁdence 
level to indicate the probability with which an insurance 
company has to be able to fulﬁl its obligation towards 
policyholders in the period up to the expiration of the 
last contract (Chart 2). The required conﬁdence level will 
ultimately have to be chosen on the basis of the results 
of the QIS, in which levels of 60 p.c., 75 p.c. and 90 p.c. 
have already been tested.
However,  according  to  some  market  participants  and 
supervisors, this approach is not market-consistent and 
might unnecessarily incorporate an additional layer of pru-


















CHART 2  TECHNICAL PROVISIONS : BEST ESTIMATE AND 
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(1)  The first quantitative impact study tested confidence levels for the technical 
provisions of 60  p.c., 75  p.c. and 90 p.c.194
be identiﬁed and incorporated in the capital requirement). 
They also argue that, if it is decided that prudence should 
be introduced in the valuation of insurance liabilities, to 
take into account uncertainty in the determination of the 
market value margin, this would be better dealt with by 
the capital requirements (see below).
A method that accommodates these concerns is the cost 
of capital approach, proposed in the Swiss Solvency Test. 
According  to  this  approach,  the  additional  risk  margin 
would  equal  the  hypothetical  cost  of  capital  necessary 
to run off all the insurance liabilities, following ﬁnancial 
distress in a company. The argument is that a knowledge-
able, willing party will only agree to take over an insur-
ance portfolio if the cost of capital associated with this 
portfolio is included in its value.
A rough idea of the impact of the introduction of these 
new valuation methods for insurance companies’ liabili-
ties  is  provided  by  the  results  of  the  ﬁrst  quantitative 
impact study. This study, of which the detailed results are 
published by the Commission Bancaire, Financière et des 
Assurances  (CBFA)  for  Belgium  and  by  CEIOPS  for  the 
entire EU, has tested the level of prudence in technical 
provisions under several hypotheses. The tests were based 
on individual ﬁrm data as at the end of 2004, represent-
ing, in the case of Belgium, about 60 p.c. of the total 
market in life insurance and 50 p.c. in non-life insurance. 
However, the methods applied by individual companies 
were not necessarily fully comparable and not all com-
panies provided all information, as a result of which the 
aggregates provided below are not always internally con-
sistent. They should be interpreted with caution and can 
only serve to provide a rough estimate  (1).
The exercise revealed that in most cases the best estimate 
of the technical provisions is lower than the current level 
(Table 1). Adding a risk margin does not seem to have a 
large impact on the level of the provisions. For life insur-
ance,  the  best  estimate  of  the  liabilities,  including  the 
provisions for future bonuses, amounts to 90.2 p.c. of the 
current level of the provisions, which do not include these 
bonuses. This lower level is mainly attributable to the fact 
that future cash ﬂows of long term liabilities would be dis-
counted at higher rates compared to the technical interest 
rates  currently  used  in  the  calculation  of  the  technical 
provisions. Adding a risk margin to obtain a conﬁdence 
level  of  90  p.c.  would  only  increase  the  provisions  to   
93.5 p.c. of their current level.
In non-life insurance, the best estimates of the liabilities 
are provided both on an undiscounted basis, as is cur-
rently the case in Belgium, and on a discounted basis, 
which is more market-consistent. The undiscounted best 
estimate  amounts  to  82.0  p.c.  of  the  current  level  of 
the provisions, while the discounted value would equal   
74.2 p.c. of the current level. The impact of discounting 
is thus signiﬁcant. The addition of a margin in order to 
obtain a 90 p.c. conﬁdence level would increase the dis-
counted provisions to 79.1 p.c. of their current level.
Compared to the European average, the current level of 
provisions of Belgian insurance companies seems to be 
somewhat  more  conservative,  in  both  life  and  non-life 
insurance. However, there are large differences between 
countries.
3.2    Minimum Capital Requirement and Solvency 
Capital Requirement
On  top  of  the  technical  provisions,  Solvency  II  intro-
duces  two  capital  layers,  called  the  Minimum  Capital 
Requirement (MCR) and the Solvency Capital Requirement 
(SCR) (Chart 3).
Note that the capital requirements differ from the provi-
sions  in  terms  of  their  scope  and  time  horizon.  While 
provisions serve to cover the expected liabilities towards 
policyholders, increased by a margin for risk and uncer-
tainty, the capital requirements provide a buffer against 
unexpected  losses  (tail  risks).  These  losses  do  not  only 
include unexpected insurance losses, but also the losses 
resulting from the materialisation of other types of risks. 
TABLE  1  IMPACT OF THE INTRODUCTION OF MARKET
BASED VALUATION ON THE LEVEL
OF BELGIAN INSURANCE COMPANIES’
TECHNICAL PROVISIONS (1)
(Percentages of the effective level of the technical provisions 









Life insurance (2) . . . . . . . . . . . . 90.2 91.6 93.5
Non-life insurance (3) . . . . . . . .
Undiscounted . . . . . . . . . . . 82.0 84.7 n.
Discounted . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74.2 76.6 79.1
Source: CBFA.
(1) Data gross of reinsurance.
(2) Including provisions for future bonuses.
(3) Both premiums and claims provisions.
(1)  For detailed information on the methods of calculation and the caveats of the 
exercise we refer to Commission Bancaire, Financière et des Assurances (2006).195
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In  addition,  provisions  and  capital  requirements  differ 
in their time dimension : provisions cover the claims up 
to the expiration of all policies, while capital provides a 
buffer against losses within a period of one year.
The distinction between two capital levels is related to the 
characteristics of the insurance business, where solvency 
problems can be resolved over a longer period of time 
than in the banking sector. Given the long duration of 
their  contracts,  insurance  companies  face  lower  liquid-
ity risk and have a longer time span in which to address 
solvency problems. This allows more gradual supervisory 
intervention. Such an approach is not possible in banking, 
where high liquidity risk and the risk of loss of conﬁdence 
and bank runs in the event of solvency problems require 
immediate, decisive supervisory action.
The  following  discussion  of  the  capital  requirements 
is  based  on  the  most  recent  information  available.  It 
includes the options envisaged in the second quantitative 
impact study, which deals with the MCR and the SCR. 
However, it is clear that the results of this exercise and 
further discussions may still alter the design of the capital 
requirements.
3.2.1  Minimum Capital Requirement
The MCR is intended to provide a safety net. This means 
that, on an ongoing basis, the MCR does not necessar-
ily reﬂect an adequate level of capital, but a level below 
which  the  capital  of  a  company  cannot  fall  without   
causing an unacceptable risk to policyholders. Therefore, 
if  an  undertaking’s  capital  drops  below  the  MCR,  the 
supervisory authority is obliged to react immediately using 
the  most  severe  supervisory  tools,  including  the  with-
drawal of the company’s licence. The supervisory action 
in this case is immediate and rule-based. The MCR is the 
ultimate prudential level and will in general be lower than 
the SCR. It is, however, subject to an absolute minimum, 
expressed  in  euros,  similar  to  the  minimum  guarantee 
fund in the present framework.
The  MCR  is  an  essential  part  of  prudential  supervision 
under  the  future  Solvency  II  framework.  It  provides  an 
EU-wide  harmonised,  standardised  formula  applying  to 
all insurance undertakings. The MCR should not be calcu-
lated using internal models, since the capital requirements 
based on these models might differ considerably from one 
company to another according to the assumptions used, 
which is found undesirable for the bottom capital level. 
Moreover, the calculation of the MCR should be robust 
and transparent in order to minimise compliance costs.
The MCR could, according to CEIOPS’ response to  the 
Commission’s Call for Advice number 9, be calculated on 
the basis of the SCR standard formula. Such a method 
would be fully integrated into the new risk-based frame-
work and would be consistent with the overall prudential 
objectives  of  the  new  regime.  However,  the  feasibility 
of this approach depends entirely on the robustness of 
the SCR standard formula. Therefore, if this approach is 
adopted, a transitional period between the introduction 
of the SCR and the adaptation of the MCR is suggested.
In this transitional phase, it is envisaged to use a formula 
based  on  the  Solvency  I  requirements  to  calculate  the 
MCR.  The  MCR  could,  for  instance,  equal  half  of  the 
current solvency requirement. Such a method will, how-
ever, need to reﬂect the new methods of valuing assets 
and  liabilities.  Although  this  approach  is  simple  and  is 
expected to reduce compliance and transition costs for 
insurance companies, it is not fully consistent with the 
philosophy of Solvency II.
In the ﬁnal stage, the calculation of the MCR on the basis 
of the SCR standard formula may take different forms. 
One possibility is to set the MCR to a certain ﬁxed percent-
age of the SCR. Another option would be to use a simpli-
ﬁed version of the standard SCR formula, concentrating 
on the most important risk categories, possibly applying 
a more straightforward aggregation technique, and cali-
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3.2.2  Solvency Capital Requirement
The SCR reﬂects the capital level an insurance company 
needs  to  maintain  in  order  to  have  a  sufﬁciently  low 
risk of failure. The SCR is therefore the level of capital 
deemed required for the insurance market to function 
safely. It corresponds to the level of capital that enables 
an insurance company to absorb signiﬁcant unexpected 
losses over a one year time horizon and gives reasonable 
assurance to policyholders that payments will be made 
as they fall due. This “reasonable assurance” will be pro-
vided by the use of a certain conﬁdence level. Currently, 
a level of 99.5 p.c. is envisaged. It means that the prob-
ability that a company will be able to absorb unforeseen 
losses without falling insolvent within a one-year time 
period is 99.5 p.c.
Compared to the MCR, the SCR is a more ﬂexible control 
instrument. It means that once a company’s available capi-
tal falls below the SCR, the supervisor can choose from a 
number of suitable tools to urge the company to increase 
its capital within a reasonable time horizon, for instance 
the request of additional information, the establishment 
of a ﬁnancial recovery plan or possibly also a prohibition 
on underwriting new business.
Solvency II provides for two possible calculation methods 
for the SCR : one using a standardised formula and one 
based  on  insurance  companies’  internal  models.  Both 
methods allow for the calibration of the capital require-
ments in accordance with an undertaking’s risk proﬁle. 
Box  1  provides  more  information  on  both  calculation 
methods.
Box 1  –  Calculation of the Solvency Capital Requirement
Just as in Basel II for banks, the SCR can be calculated using either a standardised formula or the company’s 
internal models. While the ﬁrst method is less ﬂexible and cannot fully capture the real risk proﬁle of each 
individual company, it simpliﬁes the calculations and entails lower compliance costs. Although such a method 
might remain appropriate for simple companies with an average risk proﬁle, it does not capture the real risk 
proﬁle of complex companies with very speciﬁc activities, for which the use of internal models should be the norm.   
To  encourage  effective  risk  management,  the  SCR  will  take  account  of  reinsurance  and  other  forms  of  risk 
mitigation techniques.
Standardised approach
The standardised approach will apply a relatively simple formula. It will relate capital requirements to each risk 
category, which will then be combined in an overall capital requirement. For these calculations, a factor-based 
approach, whereby capital requirements are obtained by applying ﬁxed percentages to a range of balance sheet 
or income statement items, will be used.
It  is  clear  that  the  standardised  calculations  will  not  be  able  to  fully  reﬂect  each  individual  company’s  risk 
proﬁle. For instance, they will not capture the links between assets and liabilities and non-linear effects such as   
non-proportionate reinsurance, options or guarantees. Therefore, it is proposed, especially in life insurance, to use 
scenario analyses to supplement the factor-based calculation.
The robustness and reliability of the standard formula will depend, to a great extent, on the methodology used 
in its construction. One method would be to set a capital requirement for each risk separately. In such a bottom 
up approach, the different capital components have to be combined into an overall requirement, whereby the 
diversiﬁcation effects across risk factors will have to be taken into account. This requires a good understanding of 
risk dependencies. The results of the quantitative impact studies will be used to calibrate these calculations.
4197
THE NEW SOLVENCY FRAMEWORK FOR  
EUROPEAN INSURANCE COMPANIES
Supervisors may, under Pillar II, require insurance compa-
nies to hold an additional amount of capital. This decision 
will be taken at an individual level and be based on the 
supervisory review process. This increased capital require-
ment will be called the adjusted SCR.
Solvency II will also include new speciﬁcations regarding 
the categories of balance sheet items that will be eligible 
as capital to meet solvency requirements. These new rules 
will ensure compatibility with other ﬁnancial sectors and 
take  into  account  recent  capital  market  developments. 
Insurance companies may, of course, choose to hold more 
capital than required by regulation for a number of rea-
sons, e.g. to obtain a certain rating, to ﬁnance growth or 
to signal their shareholders’ commitment. This additional 
capital corresponds to the free surplus in Chart 3.
3.3  Investment policies
One  of  the  main  weaknesses  of  the  current  solvency 
framework for European insurance companies is that the 
rules governing the assets used to cover technical provi-
sions and regulatory own funds are not fully harmonised. 
This sometimes results in different local interpretations, 
potentially leading to unfair competition. In addition, due 
to recent developments in ﬁnancial markets, it is not clear 
whether or not insurers may invest in a range of new 
ﬁnancial instruments.
Solvency  II  will  therefore  introduce  new  rules  on  the 
investment policy adopted by insurance companies. It is 
proposed that the assets covering the technical provisions, 
the SCR and the MCR are subject to the same rules.
However,  the  form  of  those  investment  policy  rules 
remains  uncertain.  A  combination  of  three  types  of 
requirements is envisaged to deal with investment risk. 
First, investment risk will be incorporated in the SCR (see 
above). Second, Solvency II will most likely provide eligibil-
ity criteria for assets covering the technical provisions and 
the capital requirements, and impose quantitative limits 
on asset concentrations both to single asset classes and 
counterparties. The eligibility of assets may be determined 
either on the basis of a prescribed list of acceptable (or 
unacceptable) categories of instruments, or by outlining 
the characteristics that assets must (or must not) possess 
(i.e.  principle  based),  or  perhaps  by  using  a  combina-
tion of both methods. Third, Solvency II will, as part of 
its second pillar, provide qualitative requirements on the 
appropriate management of assets and liabilities and a 
prudent investment policy. This combination of qualitative 
and quantitative requirements would be referred to as the 
“Prudent Person Plus” approach.
Here  too,  in  the  context  of  the  supervisory  review   
process, supervisors will perform a qualitative evaluation   
of  an  undertaking’s  investment  and  ALM  strategies, 
including the approach to diversiﬁcation, and, if need be, 
could increase the capital requirements.
Internal models
The alternative SCR calculation method uses insurance companies’ internal models. These should better reﬂect the 
business proﬁle of an undertaking, and thus, allow to better calibrate the regulatory capital according to the real 
capital needs. The implementation of such internal models requires a much more sophisticated actuarial approach 
as well as highly developed risk management structures. Therefore, these models will have to be validated by the 
regulator on an individual basis.
As in banking, the application of internal models requires that supervisors adopt a much more individualised 
approach to supervision, for instance for the validation of their internal models. This will require the availability of 
highly qualiﬁed staff.
Solvency II might permit more comprehensive use of internal models than Basel II, as it aims at allowing insurance 
companies  to  base  the  calculation  of  their  capital  requirements  entirely  on  their  internal  models.  Currently,   
Basel II only allows the capital required for market and operational risks to be calculated solely on the basis of 
internal models. For the most important risk factor, credit risk, this is not the case, as the internal ratings-based 
approach only allows banks to generate themselves the parameters needed in the calculation of the required 
capital, while the formula for the calculation itself is prescribed by regulation.198
Conclusions
The new Solvency II framework for insurance companies 
is  clearly  inspired  by  the  Basel  II  framework  for  banks. 
Thus, it will adopt the same three pillar framework and   
introduce the use of internal models in the calculation 
of  the  required  capital.  The  similarities  essentially  stem 
from the fact that both pursue the same goal : they aim 
at adapting the solvency system of banks and insurance 
companies to the new market environment and improv-
ing its alignment with the real risk proﬁle of the individual 
companies.
There are, however, important differences between the 
two  frameworks,  which  follow  from  the  inherent  dif-
ferences between the two types of business. Solvency II   
includes  detailed  rules  on  the  calculation  of  technical 
provisions,  which  represent  by  far  the  main  category 
of liabilities for insurance companies. It also introduces 
speciﬁc rules governing the categories of assets in which 
insurance companies may invest. In addition, the capital 
requirements are mainly focused on underwriting risk in 
insurance and on credit risk in banking. Another striking 
difference is the presence of two capital layers in Solvency II   
and only one in Basel II. This reﬂects the different time 
dimension of the two types of business : whereas banks’ 
very liquid liabilities call for immediate intervention if their 
ﬁnancial situation deteriorates, the long term nature of 
insurance  companies’  liabilities  allows  a  more  gradual 
approach.
One has to bear in mind that this presentation of Solvency II   
is still provisional. Although the main characteristics have 
already been decided, a lot of issues are still under discus-
sion. In the coming months, the European Commission, 
the EU Member States and market participants will con-
tinue  their  discussions  on  the  Framework  Directive.  In 
this connection, the European Commission has requested 
additional advice from CEIOPS on pillar I issues, such as 
the valuation of technical provisions, the shape of the SCR 
and the MCR formulas, and the recognition of reinsur-
ance and other risk mitigation techniques. In order to be 
able to incorporate the view of market participants in its 
advice to the Commission, CEIOPS will, in the second half 
of this year, issue new consultation papers on these and 
other issues. At the same time, CEIOPS will continue to 
work on the implementation measures and, subsequently 
on the supervisory measures.199
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